On Stable and Efficient Mechanisms for Priority-based Allocation Problems

报告题目:On Stable and Efficient Mechanisms for Priority-based Allocation Problems

报告人:张永超   上海财经大学

报告时间:2018年11月8日 16:00-17:00

报告地点:知新楼B924

报告摘要:For school choice (priority-based allocation) problems, when the priority structure is acyclic, the associated (student-proposing) deferred acceptance algorithm is Pareto efficient and group strategy-proof (Ergin, 2002). We reveal a hidden iterative removal structure behind such deferred acceptance algorithms. A nonempty set of students is called a top fair set (TFS) if when all students apply to their most preferred schools and all schools accept the best applicants up to their quotas, students in the set are always accepted, independent of other students’ preferences. We provide an elimination process to find the maximal TFS, if any TFS exists. We show that for any priority structure, iterative removal of TFS always produces a complete assignment if and only if the associated deferred acceptance algorithm is Pareto efficient, or equivalently, if and only if the priority structure is acyclic. Furthermore, for any such priority structure, the assignment made by iteratively removing TFS coincides with that of the deferred acceptance algorithm.

报告人简介:张永超,2011年新加坡国立大学数学博士,同年加入上海财经大学,现为其经济学院副教授。主要研究领域为匹配理论,博奕论,数理经济理论;成果曾发表于Journal of Economic Theory, Theoretical Economics, Games and Economic Behavior, Advances in Mathematics等杂志。

邀请人:徐进